Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking: An Overview by Rodrigo A. Alfaro et al.
1
This introduction and the papers in this volume were submitted in March 2009, 
and thus reflect developments that had taken place up to that date.  
Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking, edited by Rodrigo A. 
Alfaro, Santiago, Chile. © 2010 Central Bank of Chile.
Financial Stability, Monetary  
Policy, and central banking:  
an overview
Rodrigo A. Alfaro
Central Bank of Chile
Rodrigo Cifuentes S.
Central Bank of Chile
The financial developments of the last decade had a large impact 
on the management of risk, providing more diversified portfolios to 
investors. Based on these complex financial contracts, investors were 
able to shift the investment possibilities frontier outward; however, 
that movement generated intricate networks. At the same time, 
global financial integration increased significantly, facilitating the 
propagation and expansion of financial shocks. 
The recent financial crisis is evidence of such networking 
sensitivity. In February 2007, Freddie Mac announced its intention to 
reduce its mortgage portfolio risk by ceasing to purchase risky loans, 
and then in April of the same year, one of the leading companies in 
the subprime mortgage market declared bankruptcy. The two events 
foretold the ending of the housing boom in the U.S. economy and 
later exposed its financial fragility. In the following year, other U.S. 
companies related to the housing sector also declared bankruptcy. 
Meanwhile, the story in Europe was not too different. In September, 
Northern Rock was authorized additional liquidity provision by the 
Bank of England, consolidating the idea of a housing bubble that 
was transversal to developed economies. 
The propagation of the mortgage crisis to other financial 
institutions was fueled by the use of securitized packages, which 
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false reduction in credit risk. These packages were outstandingly 
attractive to other investors, for they were classified as low risk by 
professional ratings agencies, while enjoying low financing costs 
during the long period of expansive monetary policy. The mortgage 
crisis thus mushroomed into a global financial crisis, and the 
associated financial instruments came to be labeled as toxic and, 
given their inherent complexity, were difficult to price in the face of 
falling underlying prices. 
The closure of financial intermediaries linked to the mortgage 
sector affected financial institutions, with a potentially systemic 
impact. This motivated the U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.S. 
Treasury to undertake extraordinary actions, such as the provision 
of credit facilities for the acquisition of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan 
and the expansion of credit lines to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
The Federal Reserve also widened the list of acceptable collateral 
for liquidity provision. By mid-September, a new financial event 
shook all fragility indexes: Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy. 
This event resulted in a crisis of confidence and the drying up of the 
interbank market for liquidity, mainly driven by the uncertainty 
about the liquidity and solvency of the involved parties. In the 
aftermath, the Federal Reserve provided generous funding to the 
insurance company American International Group (AIG) to ensure 
the continuity of its operation. Given AIG’s intricate network of 
operations, its eventual fall would have resulted in a systemic 
liquidity problem. Afterward, both the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury generated a recovery plan for the banking sector, which 
has been replicated by other industrial economies. 
This crisis opened the debate on macroprudential policies 
and the role of monetary and international authorities. Thorough 
analysis of these policies implies assessing early alert indicators, 
the information on which these are based, and their properties. 
Likewise, the quantification of the systemic importance of any given 
financial institution allows informed choice among alternative policy 
actions. The assessment of these features allows improvements in the 
supervision framework governing financial institutions, which enables 
authorities to deal with a crisis in a timely and efficient manner. 
The Twelfth Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, 
“Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking,” 
held in Santiago on 6–7 November 2008, provided the occasion 
to discuss early warning indicators, with the subprime crisis 
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empirical research in both risk analysis by financial institutions 
and the network effects in financial markets. It also provided the 
opportunity to sketch these tools in the context of financial crises, 
thereby generating a critique on the potential weaknesses of current 
regulation. This overview summarizes the main topics discussed 
at the conference.
1. Risk assessmenT 
Financial institutions must maintain a fragile balance between 
risk taking, stemming from multiple investment decisions, and 
adequate capital provisions that guarantee enough buffer to face 
previous commitments with demand depositors. Specifically, in the 
case of banks, regulators acknowledge that the riskiest operation 
in the banking business is also the oldest: loan provision. The risk 
stems from the unilateral reneging of the debtor. A second risk 
source is market risk, which consists in the deterioration of one’s net 
position in a given unit of account, such as stock options, currency, 
or interest-bearing assets. Market risk and operational risk are 
regulated through the first pillar of the Basel II agreement, which 
covers minimum capital requirements based on risks measured from 
standardized methods or internally generated processes. 
Credit risk analysis requires a statistical structure. Merton 
(1974) highlights the importance of default probabilities. His work 
assumes that a firm has risky assets, so that its market value 
corresponds to the value of a purchase option whose exercise price 
is the institution’s debt burden valued at the risk-free rate. This 
model provides a method for extracting asset market values and 
their volatilities (Duffie and Wang, 2004). Alternatively, Crouhy, 
Galai, and Mark (2000) use Ito’s lemma to relate asset volatilities 
with a firm’s market value volatility, forming a system of nonlinear 
equations to obtain the market value of assets and their volatility.1 
One relevant statistic in this setup is distance to distress, which 
is the number of standard deviations that the asset value is above 
the debt value. Under Merton’s (1974) model, default probability is 
1. Byström (2007) presents a simplified distance to distress, in which (i) the trend 
factor is small and (ii) default probability is close to zero. Under these assumptions, 
distance to distress is defined by the firm's leverage and its market value volatility, 
so it can be obtained directly from balance sheets and market information without 
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computed using the cumulative normal distribution of the negative 
distance to distress. 
Because the model is based on option values, it has been labeled 
contingent claims analysis (CCA) and has been used successfully at 
the institutional level (Duffie and Wang, 2004). In contrast, option 
pricing requires that the default probability derived from the distance 
to distress be calculated under a risk-neutrality assumption.2 
Additionally, Crosbie (2001) modifies distance to distress so that 
the resulting default probability mimics the historical distribution 
of default. For this purpose, he uses the Sharpe quotient to correct 
the trend effect and employs more general density functions than the 
normal distribution. These measures are commercialized by Moody’s 
KMV under the name of expected default frequencies (EDF). They 
have been successful in predicting firm insolvency and real variables 
(Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajsek, 2008). 
In this volume, Dale Gray, Robert Merton, and Zvi Bodie discuss 
how to extend CCA for different economic sectors, including the 
corporate, financial, household, and sovereign (government and 
monetary authorities) sectors. The authors outline the relevant risk 
transfers and then use these to elaborate a procedure for developing 
macroeconomic stress tests that affect financial stability, defined 
by the solvency of the banking system. Gray and Malone (2008) 
develop the CCA model using the cases of Thailand during the 
Asian crisis and Brazil in 2002. Blavy and Souto (2009) use banks’ 
EDFs to establish a macro-financial model for the Mexican banking 
system. They find a strong relation between domestic interest 
rates and EDFs, which also provide an early warning for financial 
instability. For Chile, Dale Gray, Carlos García, Leonardo Luna, and 
Jorge Restrepo develop a small dynamic macroeconomic model that 
includes the distance to default of the banking system. The authors 
confirm that the dynamic and nonlinear elements of their model 
result in more persistent shock trajectories than those stemming 
from traditional vector autoregression (VAR) models.3 They also 
2. Because the risk-free rate is lower than asset returns, this probability should be 
adjusted to better reflect the distance to distress. Zurita (2008) uses this methodology 
for forecasting bankruptcies among Chilean businesses. He finds that CCA delivers 
much higher bankruptcy probabilities than those empirically observed.
3. Similar results are found by Alfaro, Calvo, and Oda (2009), who consider the 
dynamics of banking aggregates in a nonlinear VAR. Misina and Tessier (2008) consider 
that a fundamental issue in stress-test models is their nonlinear component, which 
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explore the consequences for output and inflation volatilities (and 
their trade-off) when the Taylor rule considers systemic risk through 
distance-to-distress deviations. Using simulations, they conclude that 
the central bank’s consideration of distance-to-distress deviations 
reduces both inflation and output volatilities. 
A micro-oriented approach is presented by Marcelo Fuenzalida 
and Jaime Ruiz-Tagle, who assess household financial risk using data 
from the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de Protección Social, or 
EPS) and the Household Financial Survey (Encuesta Financiera de 
Hogares, or EFH). The EPS contains historical labor-related data 
on individuals who are active in the labor market, for each surveyed 
household. Using this information, the authors model unemployment 
duration to characterize labor income, which is the main source of 
financial risk at the household level. Their results show that the 
higher the attained educational level, the lower the probability of 
becoming unemployed. The EFH is conducted by the Central Bank 
of Chile and is based on a similar survey conducted by the Bank of 
Spain (Bover, 2004). Its aim is to characterize Chilean household 
debt, which translates into an oversampling of households in higher 
income quintiles and motivates the inclusion of extensive detail 
in the survey section relating to debt. Using the results from the 
unemployment duration section, Fuenzalida and Ruiz-Tagle simulate 
financial stress tests on the surveyed households. They consider as 
risky those households whose financial-burden-to-income ratio is 
above 75 percent, and whose expenditure level is above 20 percent of 
total household income. Under this definition, 9.5 percent of surveyed 
households are risky, and they account for 16 percent of the total 
debt documented in the survey. Stress test exercises also show that 
a rise in the unemployment rate generates a less-than-proportional 
increase of total household debt at risk. 
2. neTwoRk effeCTs 
A second element in risk analysis is the existence of network 
effects among involved financial institutions. These could be the 
outcome of financial and real factors. In the first category, we 
include the spillover effects generated between financial markets 
that had given rise to the literature on financial contagion well 
before the crisis. Statistical measures of financial contagion have 
been developed in the seminal work of King and Wadhwani (1990), 
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the same line, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) propose the concept of 
contagion as a force that is exogenous to the inherent dynamics of 
financial markets. 
In this volume, Francis Diebold and Kamil Yilmaz use the 
variance decomposition of a VAR model to capture the spillover 
effects that were observed in stock markets in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, and the United States. They use this index to identify 
the main episodes of turbulence from 1994 to 2008. Their results 
show that the current financial crisis displays similar features to 
the Asian and Mexican crises. Beirne and others (2008) present 
statistical evidence on the increase of spillover effects during periods 
of financial turbulence. This is consistent with the empirical evidence 
that spillover effects run from developed economies to emerging 
economies during these periods of stress, and because emerging 
economies tend to be financially weaker, they are more prone to 
display higher volatility. 
In terms of network contagion analysis, Prasanna Gai and Sujit 
Kapadia present a network model in which it is possible to separate 
the network contagion probability from its potential systemic impact. 
The authors discuss the observation by Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin 
(2005) that the higher the connectivity of a network, the higher its 
capacity to absorb shocks, but at the same time, the more channels 
through which the shock can be transmitted. Under some of the 
scenarios studied, the total effect on the system is higher than would 
be the case with lower connectivity. In a different paper, David 
Aikman, Piergiorgio Alessandri, Bruno Eklund, Prasanna Gai, Sujit 
Kapadia, Elizabeth Martin, Nada Mora, Gabriel Sterne, and Matthew 
Willison present the RAMSI Project, which adds financing liquidity 
risk to a model of credit risk and valuation contagion. In particular, 
the project proposes a criterion to incorporate diverse information 
from financial institutions’ balance sheets and from the market to 
determine intermediaries’ access to market funding. The model 
represents an important advance in the available toolkit for stress 
test exercises on the financial system.4 
Interdependencies among lenders have a strong impact on the 
credit risk of asset portfolios. Vasicek (1987) presents a simple 
solution to correct default probabilities under an atomized portfolio. 
The model assumes that the standardized returns of each asset can be 
4. Jara, Luna, and Oda (2008) present a discussion on risk scenarios for the Chilean 
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explained by a common factor and an idiosyncratic one. It then uses 
the average correlation between asset returns to correct the default 
probability. Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2005) discuss the applicability 
of the credit-risk model proposed in Basel II, according to which it is 
possible to establish capital requirements for classes of loans. 
Alternatively, copula models have been used in the joint modeling 
of asset risk (Cherubini, Luciano, and Vecchiato, 2004; Li, 2000). 
Copulas allow the generation of joint distribution functions based 
on the univariate distribution of each asset and on measures of their 
codependencies. Risk analysis can then be undertaken in a two step 
procedure: first, for every loan or institution, and, second, for the 
whole portfolio or related system. Copulas thus possess twice as 
many degrees of freedom, as the analyst may choose to work with 
several different univariate distribution functions and then obtain 
multivariate analysis based on different copulas. 
Miguel Segoviano and Charles Goodhart present a paper on 
measuring financial stability in the U.S. banking system. They use 
univariate measures obtained from the market prices of banks’ credit 
default swaps (CDSs) and a nonparametric copula (CIMDO) that 
collapses this information at the bank level on a maximum entropy 
basis. They use the CDSs to extract information on the default 
probability under risk neutrality, obtaining superior information 
to the EDFs when derivatives markets are developed. Singh and 
Spackman (2009) propose using these measures in combination with 
stochastic recovery rates, which would provide more adequate signals 
during episodes of stress. Additionally, CIMDO has advantages over 
parametric copulas, in that it does not require the parameterization 
of banks’ default dependence measures, such as the Kendall or 
Spearman coefficients. 
Finally, macroeconomic theory incorporates financial frictions 
into risk analysis, through extensions to general equilibrium models. 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) present a model where 
firms face external financing costs that are above the risk-free rate. 
This difference can be traced to the firm’s agency cost of generating 
a credit contract. The paper by Ethan Cohen-Cole and Enrique 
Martínez-García extends the Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist model to 
include banks’ capital adequacy requirements in their modeling. 
This results in a higher difference, mainly through the balance sheet 
channel. The authors suggest that monetary authorities could use 
this effect to smooth the business cycle generated by the potential 
rise in agency costs. 8 Rodrigo A. Alfaro and Rodrigo Cifuentes S.
3. The finanCial CRisis 
The recent financial crisis presents monumental challenges 
to regulatory design. This issue is discussed by Garry Schinasi 
who proposes a new regulatory framework that can generate the 
appropriate incentives and establish clear rules. The author holds 
that the current framework is flawed in the excessive confidence in 
private risk management and market discipline. Similarly, Claudio 
Borio and Mathias Drehmann discuss the difficulties of establishing 
an adequate regulatory framework when the authority observes only 
incomplete or lagged financial fragility indicators. 
The papers by Charles Goodhart, Dimitrios Tsomocos, and 
Alexandros Vardoulakis and by Michael Bordo present proposals for 
understanding the current financial crisis. The former paper uses a 
model of heterogeneous agents for banks and households. The results 
show that monetary policy may help tame the effects of financial 
market illiquidity (which is consistent with the results found by 
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) and that bank provisions could have a 
role in times of scarce liquidity. Michael Bordo critically reviews the 
main milestones of the financial crisis. In his conference paper, he 
argues that the pressure on business cycles, generated by financial 
bubbles, originates in loan allocation. His conclusions stress that the 
lessons of the current financial crisis will strengthen the U.S. banking 
market and beef up the conviction that the coordination and efficacy 
of regulators are crucial elements in these extreme scenarios. 9 Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking
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